University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts Papers

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

1-1-2011

Computational drawing: code and invisible operation
Brogan S. Bunt
University of Wollongong, brogan@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bunt, Brogan S., "Computational drawing: code and invisible operation" (2011). Faculty of Law, Humanities
and the Arts - Papers. 803.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/803

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Computational drawing: code and invisible operation
Abstract
Drawing upon my own experience in developing the algorithmic drawing project, Loom, this paper
considers the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of drawing in
computational art. It is concerned particularly to reflect upon the nature of this aesthetic labour, which
involves not only programming but also the blind space of procedure.

Keywords
operation, invisible, drawing, computational, code

Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details
Bunt, B. S. "Computational drawing: code and invisible operation." ISEA Istanbul 2011 Conference
Proceedings: The 17th International Symposium on Electronic Art, 14-21 September. Ed. L. Aceti and o. .
Istanbul: Leonardo/ISAST, ISEA Foundation, Sabanci University or Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011.
1-8.

This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/803

Computational Drawing: Code and Invisible Operation
Brogan Bunt
Abstract
Drawing upon my own experience in developing the algorithmic drawing project, Loom, this paper
considers the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of drawing in
computational art. It is concerned particularly to reflect upon the nature of this aesthetic labour,
which involves not only programming but also the blind space of procedure.

Fig. 1. Loom, 2011, Brogan Bunt, archival ink-jet print (author's image)
Subdivide an initial polygonal shape into a set of smaller polygonal shapes. Apply the same
process to each of the polygons in the new set. Continue recursively.
This instruction could be regarded as the concept informing my recent exhibition of algorithmic
drawing work, Loom. The work explores aspects of recursive geometric subdivision. Simple shapes
are subdivided into further smaller shapes. Applied many times over, complex patterns and textures
emerge. I have reservations, however, about expressing things in these terms, since my aim is to
question the notion of a purely conceptual space that precedes and dominates the sphere of technical
implementation and execution. The instruction above echoes the form of a Sol LeWitt wall drawing
statement, yet it can hardly be said to be purely conceptual. It is expressed in linguistic terms. It is
mediated through the impurity and materiality of language. More specifically, in conceiving the
aesthetic possibility of polygonal subdivision, I am drawing upon particular programming
constructs and dimensions of computational process. My creative ideas are shaped by the thinking

of data structures, algorithmic pathways and iterative patterns.
However, my interest here is not so much in demonstrating the various ways in which my
conceptual drawing statements are inevitably affected by the space of programmatic logic and
implementation, but in attempting to reconsider the relationship between the conceptual and nonconceptual aspects of computational making. Drawing upon the model of the Jacquard loom, my
work positions computational processes as mechanical means of weaving virtual cloth from simple
algorithmic patterns. My aim is to engage with the compelling power of computation, which is
linked for me to the mystery of its dumb operation - its strange invisible labour. The computer is
bound by regimes of instructional necessity, yet the opaqueness, scale and speed of its processes
suggest an uncanny agency. This paradox is vital to my work. The abstract algorithmic schema –
whether expressed as a conceptual statement or as a formal body of programming code – is never
sufficient on its own. It must be played out on a surface. It must pass from the uncertain
consciousness of code to the uncertain unconsciousness of iterative procedure. It is precisely in the
tension between algorithmic conception and repetitive, non-reflective enactment that the process of
drawing takes shape.
Computational Labour
The images in my Loom exhibition depend upon a work of programming. However, another
dimension of labour, the computational labour of machine execution (drawing), is also relevant.
How can we make sense of this work? Can it even properly be considered a genuine form of
labour?
Within the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, labour serves as a vital index of human rational and social
activity. It represents the sublimation of immediate gratification towards the goal of producing
useful things [1]. It is something that we undertake and endure with other ends in mind. In this
sense, a key aspect of human labour relates to the awareness that we could be spending our time
differently, that we are sacrificing the here and now for some other delayed space of superior
satisfaction. This aspect of conscious, steadfast and resigned choice is clearly absent in mechanical
forms of labour. The labour of the machine is unreflective. It simply proceeds. It is precisely this
feature of machine labour that attracted Alan Turing when he set out to critique David Hilbert's
axiom of decidability [2]. The distinctive characteristic of the finite state machine is that it proceeds
step by step, without any contemplation of alternative possibilities. It is this incapacity to reflect
that finally leads to its undoing. A recursive logic pushes it towards reflection and it becomes
trapped in an internal contradiction. Very importantly, however, Turing's conception of computation
does not represent an effort to distinguish the special character of human labour and thought.
Instead it serves to clarify the mechanical character of axiomatic mathematical procedure. In a

critical and ironic manner, it demonstrates the relevance of the machine in conceiving the
apparently pure workings of mathematical logic.
If machine labour appears especially alien, it is because it represents an aspect of ourselves that we
are especially keen to avoid. It serves as the uncanny double of the repetitive, mechanical,
materially determined and non-reflective dimensions of human action. In this manner – in its
curious, unsettling agency – machine labour disturbs our self-image as free and rational agents.
Within this context, it is worth recalling that Aristotle distinguishes between thinking and
unthinking dimensions of techne (making). The habitual character of manual labour, which can
proceed without a clear understanding of underlying causes, is contrasted to the conceptually
informed practice of the master-artist.
Inanimate things bring about the effects of their actions by some nature, while manual
workers do so through habit which results by practicing. Thus master-artists are
considered wiser not in virtue of their ability to do something, but in virtue of having
the theory and knowing the causes. [3]
Here the rift between human and mechanical labour takes clear social shape. Hegel also emphasises
this social dimension, tracing its historical and dialectical development. He argues that the rise of
industrial society transforms labour into a vehicle for alienation. In becoming social (and
economic), in shifting from the sphere of individual and local production towards the general
commodity market, labour grows increasingly distant from any space of immediate concrete
realisation or exchange. Endlessly abstracted and endlessly deferring immediate gratification,
concrete labour becomes decoupled from human scales of meaningful action. The rise of industrial
manufacturing processes – of machine labour and of human labour rendered machinic – only
exacerbates this sense of alienation: “[the worker] becomes through the work of the machine more
and more machine-like, dull, spiritless. The spiritual element, the self-conscious plenitude of life,
becomes as empty activity.” Machine labour produces what Hegel terms a “life of death moving
within itself”. [4]
Despite this negative assessment of the implication of machine labour, from my point of view the
interesting feature is that Hegel does not position mechanical labour as an entirely alien force (an
external imposition). Instead, an intrinsic dialectic is acknowledged. The contours of modern
alienation are immanent within human labour at the outset. They are evident in the initial split from
immediate appetitive being. In its dimension of stoic self-abnegation, human labour takes shape as a
paradox. It is both constitutive of rational human being and indicative of a turn away from the
simplicity of integral organic being. In this sense the separation of the machine – the dull, dead,
spiritually vacuous motion of its instrumental functioning – appears as an exacerbation or

materialisation of a tendency that will have always been, in some sense, properly human.
Perfunctory Execution
In my experience, programming represents a liminal space. It projects an intimate and entangled
relationship between human and machinic processes of coding and decoding, agency and
determination. Nonetheless, software programming is typically conceived in terms of notions of
conceptual priority and anteriority. Here, an interpretation of the legacy of conceptual art becomes
relevant. The work of Sol LeWitt, for example, is often regarded as emblematic of a neat,
hierarchical split between conceptual and material-practical aspects of making. In an article about
his 2004 {Software} Structures exhibition, Casey Reas positions Sol LeWitt’s wall drawings as a
model for his own software art practice.
The relation between LeWitt and his draftsperson is often compared to the relation
between a composer and performer, but I think it’s also valid to look at the comparison
between a programmer and the entity of execution. [5]
Software programming is likened to the conceptual field of LeWitt’s written wall drawing
instructions, while the field of program execution (of computational process) is likened to the
manual labour of realising the instructions on any specific wall. At the same time, however, Reas
acknowledges a key point of difference. LeWitt’s instructions lack the precision of programming
code. They are conveyed in natural language and directed towards human readers. Rather than
entirely restricting the space of execution, they work to suggest a focused field of creative
possibility. Reas is keen to regard software art in similar terms, aiming to identify a form of
conceptual software practice that precedes actual software programming, providing a generative
conceptual basis for all manner of actual algorithmic drawings.
The work develops in the vague domain of image and then matures in the more defined
structures of natural language before any thought is given to a specific machine
implementation. [6]
He employs the term “software structure” to designate this pre-computational, creative-conceptual
field and associates it with a potential for intuition and expressive freedom.
I want programming to be as immediate and fluid as drawing and I work with software
in a way that minimizes the technical aspects. I often spend a few days creating a core
piece of technical code and then months working with it intuitively, modifying it
without considering the core algorithms. I use the same code base to create myriad
variations as I operate on the fundamental code structure as if it were a drawing –
erasing, redrawing, reshaping lines, moulding the surface through instinctual actions.

[7]
No doubt LeWitt’s wall drawing work is full of curious paradoxes in which the machinic and the
intuitive intersect, but it seems odd to harness it in the interest of describing a notion of expressive
and de-technologised computational drawing. LeWitt is associated much more with a critique of the
modernist concern with subjective, materially-based expression. As Ana Lovatt suggests, “[a]gainst
prevailing notions regarding the immediacy, directness and primacy of drawing, LeWitt devised a
drawing practice that was always already mediated by technologies of reproduction and
communication.” [8]
Now while Reas never positions software structures as literally material, he conceives them very
much in terms of “the vague domain of image”. [9] In this manner, the notion of software structure
recalls the mute and intuitive aesthetics of formalist modernism. It envisages an intimate,
traditionally expressive realm of creative conceptualisation that is grounded in the space of
perceptual manifestation. In this respect, Reas reinforces the boundaries between the intuitive and
the procedural. The domain of conceptual expression, of software programming, is positioned as a
form of alienation from intuitive conceptualisation. It manifests the underlying concept in an
estranged language that is properly distinct from the inner sanctum of creative conceptual
imagination. A conceptual space is delineated, but in terms that precisely correspond to the
reassuring visibility of the material image.
I prefer another reading of LeWitt's wall drawing project. Rather than indicating a neatly
hierarchical division between the conceptual and the operational, his work suggests a play of mutual
imbrication, mirroring and exchange. Moreover, rather than the conceptual appearing as a
subjectively grounded sphere of autonomy and dominance and the executable as an utterly
derivative space of expressive material determination, their relation is articulated in profoundly
curious and unsettling terms. Consider this classic statement from his 1967 “Paragraphs on
Conceptual Art”.
In conceptual art the idea of concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an
artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all the planning and decisions are
made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine
that makes the art. [10]
This appears to belittle the sphere of actual making. The work of manual drawing is portrayed as
trivial and secondary. However, there is a an ambivalence. The term “perfunctory” suggests a task
that is mechanically performed, without any sense of subjective investment. This strangely opens up
an affinity to the nature of conceptual practice. LeWitt insists that “the idea is a machine that makes
the art.” [11] The conceptual then is also interpreted in mechanical terms. Both the conceptual and

the executable are stripped of subjectivity. They both preserve a procedural, non-reflective aspect.
In his 1969 “Sentences on Conceptual Art”, LeWitt describes the ideational blindness of the
conceptual: “The artist cannot imagine his art, and cannot perceive it until it is complete.” [12]
Ultimately, the intuitive machinery of the conceptual enters into relation with the machinery of
making.
28. Once the idea of the piece is established in the artist’s mind and the final form is
decided, the process is carried out blindly. There are many side effects that the artist
cannot imagine. These may be used as ideas for new works.
29. The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It should run its course
[13]
The value of the “perfunctory” is clearly evident here. It is a productive dimension of mechanism
that tests and inspires new concepts. Although apparently distant and distinct, the spaces of
conception and execution find themselves allied and linked. They share a common antagonism to
the thinking of subjective expression. Together, as paired coordinates, they suggest a notion of
drawing that reaches beyond the human, struggling to find effective means to engage with
dimensions of blind process.
Shimmering
I will conclude by briefly considering an alternative model for thinking the relation between
conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of computational practice. It is drawn from a specific
mode of painting within Australian Indigenous art. Howard Morphy describes the technique of
Eastern and Central Arnhem Land painting: “painting is seen as a process of transforming a surface
from a state of dullness to that of shimmering brilliance (bir’yunhamirri).” [14] He describes a
clearly defined set of steps:
1. The painting surface is covered in an overall wash (typically red-ochre).
2. The key forms are outlined in yellow and black and basic figurative elements are coloured
in.
3. Large portions of the surface are covered in “cross-hatched” infill with a special long brush.
4. The final work involves “outlining the figures and cross-hatched areas in white to create a
clear edge which defines their form.” [15]
Stage one is a straightforward process. Stage two depends upon high-order artistic skill and a close
understanding of relevant representational traditions and protocols. Morphy notes that the second
stage is performed relatively quickly by “a senior person”. [16] Stage three is the most timeconsuming, demanding technical skill but less demonstrable cultural knowledge. The final stage
draws the painting together and is closely directed by the senior artist.

My specific interest is in the sophisticated mediation that this artistic process enables between
elements of conceptualisation and mechanical technique. The term ‘mechanical’ has to be used
carefully here. It is less, in this instance, to liken Aboriginal painting to the characteristic forms of
industrial production than to pinpoint a dimension of iterative, non-conceptually grounded process
within Aboriginal art-making. It is not as though the work of producing cross-hatched infill does not
have conceptual, aesthetic resonance, it is that it gains this resonance and this potential to shape a
shimmering aesthetic surface by casting itself in terms of a repetitive articulation of time and space.
The work has a ritual, performative aspect. In relation to the cross-hatching, Morphy argues that
“Yolngu are not merely producing an aesthetic effect but moving the image towards the ancestral
domain. The cross-hatched surface of the painting reflects the power of the ancestral being it
represents, the quality of the shininess is the power of the ancestral beings incarnate in the object.”
[17] In this sense, the work becomes a means of summoning and invocation. Slow and mechanical,
it shapes a real and affective alignment with dimensions of ancestral being and opens up the
possibility of manifestation. From this perspective then, processes of conceptualisation and
mechanical technique are mutually imbricated. The distinction between concept and technique does
not take a binary shape, but is instead structured as a play of mediation within the overall creative
process. Concepts emerge as much from the labour of mechanical repetition, which serves as a field
of intimate communication and connection, as from the processes of mechanical repetition are
inevitably inflected by the rich context of cultural meaning.
This example indicates other ways of making sense of the relationship between conceptualisation
and practical making within art; suggesting the need to re-evaluate the non-reflective character of
making and to acknowledge the dynamic exchange between concept and mechanism within art. The
relation between the two is no longer cast in binary and hierarchical terms – rather they appear
congruent and enmeshed. I would argue that something like this is also what the creative
programmer experiences. The close relation between writing, compilation and running that
programming entails fosters a new, uncertain relation between the regimes of conceptual logic and
mechanical operation. The programmer seeks not only to choreograph and determine computational
processes but also, at the same time, to explore an uncanny space in which the already alien
algorithmic concept passes into the executable, non-reflective event and phenomenon.
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